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Abstract:  
Purpose: The recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more 
recent 2008-09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis 
explanation and prediction. This paper provides an analytical review of proxies for and important 
determinants of banking crises −credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and 
supervision.  
Design/methodology/approach: The study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing 
proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy-related variables in the literature. 
Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.   
Findings: Disagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part explained by the 
difference in the chosen proxies used in empirical models.  The usefulness of different proxies 
depend partly on constraints in terms of time and country coverage but also on what particular 
policy question is asked. 
Originality: The study offers a comprehensive analysis of measurements of banking crises, 
credit growth, financial liberalization and banking regulations and concludes with an assessment 
of existing proxies and databases. Since the review points to the choice of proxies that best fit 
specific research objectives, it should serve as a reference point for empirical researchers in the 
banking crisis area.  
Keywords: Banking crisis definition, domestic and external financial liberalization, credit 
growth, measures of bank regulation  
Paper type: General Review 
                                                 
∗  We are grateful for comments on earlier drafts from James Barth, Alice Ouyang, Tom Willett, 
and participants at the 86th Western Economic Association International Annual Conference, 
July 2,  2011. 
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1. Introduction 
 The recurrence of financial crises in both advanced and emerging markets throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the recent severe global financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis have led 
to an expanding literature on the determinants of financial crises. The literature has grown to 
encompass a diversity of crisis types such as: Balance of Payments-, Currency-, Banking-, Debt-, 
Inflation-, Stock market- and Real Estate crises. More often than not, they represent different 
aspects of the same crisis episodes. Financial crises are of particular concern because they often 
have real repercussions on economic growth and employment.  
In this paper we focus entirely on banking crises, which are particularly interesting for 
two reasons. First, in most countries banks play a dominant role in the financial system, 
compared to equity and debt markets. Second, the special characteristics of banks as providers of 
liquidity with longer term assets make them vulnerable to bank runs and contagion effects from 
interbank positions. In times of financial distress, even a solvent bank may fail to meet its 
obligations given the illiquid and opaque nature of its assets. Depositors and other creditors are 
often unable to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).  
While it has been argued that “blind” bank runs can be mitigated by developing deposit 
insurance systems, explicit and implicit deposit guarantees can increase the likelihood of crisis 
because they tend to increase banks’ incentives to shift risk to deposit insurance authorities and 
taxpayers while reducing the incentives of holders of bank liabilities to monitor the riskiness of 
banks’ lending activities. This moral hazard problem can lead to excessive risk-taking on the part 
of bankers. Excess risk-taking as a result of explicit and implicit guarantees of depositors and 
other creditors seems to have been a central feature in most financial crises in modern times 
according to many observers (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
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Empirical work on banking crises generally focus on one of two aspects: early warning 
signals or factors explaining banking crisis. The signals are typically indicators of 
macroeconomic activity such as credit expansion, which often interact with indicators of 
“financial fragility”. High fragility implies that the banking system is crisis prone in response to 
relatively mild economic downturns or external shocks (see, for example, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999). Meanwhile, studies on the determinants of banking crises have identified a 
number of policy-related contributing factors such as government-created safety net features for 
the banking system (e.g. deposit insurance) and institutional arrangements (e.g. financial 
liberalization, financial regulatory structures, quality of supervision, legal systems, and exchange 
rate regimes).1   
The literature has so far been unable to produce a general consensus on the key causal 
factors leading to banking crises. For example, Barth et al., (2006) find that official supervisory 
power and stricter capital requirements have no significant effect on banking crisis probabilities, 
while Noy (2004), Amri and Kocher (forthcoming) argue the opposite. Angkinand et al., (2010), 
and Shehzad and de Haan (2009) find evidence that the direction of the effect of liberalization on 
banking crises depends on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. The relationship 
among credit growth, financial liberalization and banking crises are similarly subject to 
disagreements. We return to these issues in Sections 3 and 4.   
 Given that these existing studies use different ways of operationalizing both the 
dependent and independent variables, one question that naturally arises is to what extent are the 
contradictory results driven by differences in chosen proxies? Differences in country samples 
and time-period coverage explain some differences in results but the choices of proxies for crisis, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Angkinand, et al., (2010) on the effect of financial liberalization and bank 
regulation on banking crises and Angkinand and Willett (2011) on the impact of exchange rate 
regimes.  
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liberalization, strength of supervision and credit growth seem to help explain contradictory 
results as well.2 This contention was confirmed empirically in a longer working paper version of 
this study.3 There, we report on tests of robustness for determinants of banking crises by 
changing proxies one by one in estimations for a specific group of countries over a certain period 
and a fixed set of macroeconomic controls. For example, strength of capital regulation and 
supervision (CRS) as defined by Abiad et al., (2008) has a significant negative effect while an 
index constructed by Barth et al., (2006) is not a significant explanatory factor. Similarly, the 
choices of proxies for financial liberalization and credit growth affect results.  We return to these 
findings below.  
 Motivated by disagreements in the empirical literature, this study surveys existing proxies 
and measurements of banking crises and the key crisis determinants.  Section 2 focuses on the 
definitions and proxies of banking crises. In Sections 3-5, we survey proxies for each of three 
important explanatory variables–credit expansion, financial liberalization, and bank capital 
regulation and supervision, respectively. Each section also provides a brief literature review as 
well as discussion of existing proxies. Section 6 concludes by assessing how the usefulness of 
different proxies depends on the objective of the analysis.   
 
2. Definitions and proxies for banking crises  
Banking crises can be studied on the country level as well as the bank level. A banking 
crisis on the country level refers to a situation when there are bank failures on a large scale in the 
financial system. A crisis of an individual bank can be defined more unambiguously but for 
                                                 
2 In cross-country analyses, the difference in empirical findings on the early warnings and 
determinants of banking crises could also be driven by the difference in methodologies used. 
See, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Davis and Karim (2008) for the 
review of different methodologies used in the banking crisis literature.  
3 Available at: http://www.cgu.edu/pages/1380.asp.   
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policy purposes the country level is obviously more interesting from the point of view of 
repercussions on the real economy. On the country level, likelihood of a banking crisis, banking 
system instability, lack of banking system soundness and fragility are often used more or less 
interchangeably. Banking instability generally has a broader definition than banking crisis. 
Instability may refer to disruption in the payment system or volatility of asset prices that 
potentially could lead to crises (see, for example, Mishkin 1996).   
2.1 Banking crisis on the country level 
To identify episodes of banking crises caused by bank runs, data on bank deposits could 
in principle be used. Crises originating on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets through the 
deterioration of asset values could be identified by studying, for example, non-performing loans 
(NPLs). The data for these variables are not available for a long time span and they do not 
necessarily reflect or capture widespread bank failures in the banking system. Another reason 
why so few studies use NPL data is because the reliability and comparability of the NPL data can 
be questioned in a cross country analysis. Most countries have been reluctant to reveal the 
existence of severe banking problems in official statistics, and the definition of NPL varies from 
country to country although some convergence is ongoing.  
Most studies of banking crises on the country level proceed by identifying dates of crises 
from explicit events. Generally, crisis episodes are identified based on a combination of 
objective data and interviews with experts. In some cases, quantitative data such as decline in 
deposit, NPLs and liquidity support are used with subjective judgment to identify the timing of a 
crisis event. As summarized in Table 1, the banking crisis data sets using this event-based 
approach have been provided in a small number of studies and cover a large number countries as 
well as decades. The data usually provide the beginning and ending dates of each crisis episode 
in each country.  
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The very first, comprehensive data set using this event-based approach was compiled by 
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, LGS, (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel, CK, (1996, 2002, and 
updated by Caprio et al., 2005). Databases are also compiled by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, DD, (1998, and updated in 2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff, RR, (2009). The most 
recent studies that provide banking crisis dates including the recent global financial crisis are 
Laeven and Valencia’s (LV) studies (2008 and 2010). Dates of banking crisis episodes from 
these studies are fairly highly correlated as they are compiled in a similar way and partly 
represent refinements of earlier studies. However, there are clearly great scope for judgmental 
differences with respect to the beginning and end of crises (see also Barrell et al., 2010). For 
example, the dating of the U.S. savings and loan crisis in LGS and DD is from 1980 through 
1992, while RR date the same crisis from 1986 through 1993 and CK from 1988 through1991. 
LV identify the crisis as a one year crisis which started and ended in 1988.4 
[Table 1 here] 
Dziobek and Pazarbasiogly (1997) limit the data set to “systemic crises,” wherein 
problem banks together hold at least 20 percent of total deposits in a country. Only 24 crises 
worldwide are covered in the study. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) identify crises based on 
existing studies and on the financial press. They include 20 countries from 1970 to mid-1995 in 
the study. To avoid dating too early or too late, they identify the peak period when there is the 
heaviest government intervention and/or bank closures. The objective of their paper is to 
examine the value of a number of macroeconomics variables as signals or leading indicators of 
banking crises.5 
                                                 
4 Additional statistical comparisons of the number of banking crisis episodes identified by these 
five studies can be found in the working paper version of this paper (see footnote 3).  
5 There are few other studies using the event-based approach to identify banking crisis episodes. 
Their data have been less frequently used in the literature. For the additional review, see 
Kibritcioglu (2002).    
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Existing empirical studies on banking crises employ the banking crisis indicator from the 
sources mentioned in Table 1 by assigning a 0/1 dummy for non-crisis and crisis periods. There 
are studies pointing out limitations and disadvantages of such data sets. Boyd et al., (2009), for 
example, argue that this crisis dating scheme in fact reflects government responses to perceived 
crises rather than the onset or duration of adverse shocks to the banking industry. Serwa (2010) 
points out that these data sets fail to measure the extent of a crisis. Governments also have great 
scope to employ, for example, forbearance to prevent a crisis from erupting.  
2.2 Indicators of banking sector fragility and distress of individual banks 
A second group of studies in the banking crisis literature uses a continuous scale for 
banking crisis based on variables from banks’ balance sheet and market data. The variables 
commonly used are NPLs, provision for loan losses, and equity capital in the banking systems. 
These variables are more suitable as proxies for risk-taking or fragility in a banking system or an 
individual bank since there are no clear trigger points for these variables to indicate a crisis that 
is associated with a sudden increase in fiscal and more general economic costs.6          
 There are a number of proxies for “financial stability”, indices for “financial soundness” 
and “financial stress” based on various components of balance sheet and market data for the 
banking sector. For example, Corsetti et al., (2001) use NPL as an indicator of financial 
instability, but only if there is a presence of a “lending boom.” Das et al., (2004) construct an 
index of financial system soundness from the average of the capital ratio and the (inverted) ratio 
of NPL to assets. This index is weighted by the credit-to-GDP ratio in order to capture the extent 
of financial intermediation in a country. 
                                                 
6 There are also more theory based proxies for risk-taking on the bank level intended to measure 
“distance to default.” The Z-score based on accounting data used in Boyd and Graham (1986) or 
market data  used in Hovakimian et al., (2000) incorporates the capital asset ratio, the return on 
assets and the standard deviation of this return. 
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Kibritcioglu (2002) constructs a “financial fragility index” using proxies for liquidity risk 
(bank deposits), credit risk (bank credits to the domestic private sector) and exchange rate risk 
(foreign liabilities to banks). Illing and Liu (2006) and Hakkio and Keeton (2009) create an 
“index of financial stress” using the market data such as the bond spreads for various bond types. 
An extreme value of the index is used to identify periods of financial crises. The IMF performs 
country studies on the health of the banking system under the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) instituted by the IMF and World Bank (see IMF, 2003). Indicators of the health 
of the banking system in each country are presented in these occasional studies. Indicators 
included in the financial stress index are falling asset prices, exchange rate depreciation and/or 
losses of official foreign reserves, insolvency of market participants, defaults of debtors, rising 
interest rates, and increasing volatility of financial market returns. These indicators of financial 
stress are used as leading indicators of weaknesses and disruptions of the financial system.   
Some of the indicators of financial fragility and stress discussed above build on balance 
sheet and market data for individual banks. Thus, proxies for and indicators of bank specific 
crises or distress can be constructed from variables like NPL and capital to asset ratios. The z-
score as a measure of “distance to default” (see footnote 6) belongs to the bank-specific category. 
Market prices on securities issued by individual banks can also be used to extract implicit 
probabilities of default. Angkinand et al., (forthcoming) review the timeliness of equity prices, 
subordinated debt yields and credit default spreads as indicators of distress of individual banks.  
 Interest in measures of the contribution of individual bank risk to the likelihood of a 
systemic crisis has increased as a result of the recent financial crisis. Fear of contagion from 
banks that are “too big to fail” has led to attempts to identify “systematically important financial 
institutions” (SIFIs) and their contribution to the likelihood of a crisis.  
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 There is no clear consensus on how a bank’s contribution to the systemic risk should be 
measured. Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) use variables such as bank size and interbank lending 
and borrowing as measures of a bank’s systemic importance. A group of researchers at New 
York University have developed an early warning measure geared towards providing a signal for 
the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk. This measure, the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES), is an equity market-based signal and it depends on the volatility of a bank’s 
equity price, the correlation with the market return, and the co-movement of the tails of the 
distributions. Thus, it is designed to capture special characteristics of the tails of distributions 
associated with systemic shocks. The MES is described in Brownlee and Engle (2010).7 
 
3. Measures of Credit Growth 
The role of private credit growth has been a source of disagreement within the banking 
crisis literature. There are theoretical as well as empirical grounds for the diverging views on 
credit booms. Proponents of the predominant view point to the boom-bust credit cycle 
explanation, along with distorted incentives to allocate credit away from market-determined 
criteria during periods of credit expansion. The story is straightforward: over-optimism about 
future earnings (i.e. the boom) boosts asset valuations and the net worth of the firms, 
“artificially” inflating their ability to borrow,8 but when profit expectations are unmet (i.e. the 
bust), the process is reversed, and banks face serious balance sheet problems. Others (see e.g. 
Gourinchas et al., 2001), however, view expansion of credit as a normal phase of financial 
development. Far from being a transitory development, Gourinchas et al. argue that credit booms 
can be symptomatic of improvements in investing opportunities.  
                                                 
7 Available at: http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/analysis/RISK.USFIN-MR.MES. 
8 This is formally demonstrated by Bernanke et al. (1998) through the financial accelerator 
model.  
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The relationship between rapid credit growth and banking crises remains controversial 
although most of the studies listed in Table 2 reveal a link between credit growth and subsequent 
crises. One reason is that results vary in multivariate regressions when other, possibly correlated 
variables, are included. For example, the significance of credit growth in the empirical model of 
Joyce (2010) did not hold when a proxy for financial liberalization was included. This 
observation is consistent with Mendoza and Terrones (2008). They show that credit booms were 
preceded by financial liberalization in 20 percent of cases. Amri et al. (2011) find that the 
interaction between credit growth and financial liberalization is significant in predicting banking 
crisis probability but credit growth alone is not.  
The main variable used in these studies to construct a credit boom indicator is the ratio of 
bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP9 but there are variations in how to operationalize 
the “credit boom” variable. One way is to employ a continuous measure of private credit growth, 
another to define a dichotomous measure of credit boom episodes. Within the latter group, credit 
boom is coded as 1 when there occurs “usually large” credit growth. However, there has been 
much debate about what is “unusually large” vis-à-vis “normal” credit growth – whether it can 
be captured by the deviation in the growth of credit from its trend, above a certain “normal”  
threshold, or the pace of credit growth, as compared with the growth of GDP itself. the deviation 
from GDP growth10 – as well as the appropriate statistical filters to employ. 
The continuous measure of credit growth has been used in most multivariate logit/probit 
banking crisis models with the purpose of estimating the marginal effect of private credit growth 
                                                 
9 Studies generally obtain the data for domestic bank credit to the private sector from two 
sources: 1) World Development Indicators and 2) International Financial Statistics (line 22d and 
42d). In some studies such as Mendoza and Terrones (2008), this variable is transformed into 
“real credit per capita,” by adjusting to consumer price inflation and the total population, while 
some others (see Table 2) employ “net domestic credit” which includes bank credit to both the 
government and the public sector.  
10 This measurement issue is similarly experienced in defining “sudden stops” as discussed in 
Sula et al., also in this special issue.  
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on the probability of a banking crisis. The dichotomous measure has been used in frequency 
analysis and event studies relating episodes of credit booms and banking crises (Mendoza and 
Terrones 2008). Gourinchas et al., (2001) compare probabilities of banking crises before and 
after credit boom episodes.  
 [Table 2 here] 
 
 
 
4. Data Sets for Financial Liberalization 
Many countries relaxed internal and external restrictions on their financial sectors during 
the 1980s and the 1990s. Many argue that financial liberalization lowers the cost of capital and 
encourages banks to engage in more risky projects. It has also been argued that increased 
competition can make banks become more vulnerable.   
Most early studies of the impact of financial liberalization on banking crises focused on 
the elimination of interest rate controls (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2001 and Weller, 
2001). A 0/1 dummy was used to distinguish between periods before and after liberalization. The 
literature has later expanded along with databases including liberalization of controls on credit 
allocation, external capital flows, equity markets and entry. Eichengreen and Arteta (2002), Noy 
(2004), Ranciere et al., (2006) emphasized the difference between the effects of domestic and 
external liberalization including relaxation of current and capital account restrictions.11  
The disadvantage of a dummy variable for liberalization is that it does not capture the 
extent or speed of liberalization. Continuous measures of degrees of financial liberalization 
require assumptions about the impact of liberalization on a variable affected by liberalization. 
                                                 
11 Measures of external liberalization, i.e. the degree of capital controls, are discussed in the 
paper in this special issue on “International Aspects of Currency Policies” and Potchamanawong 
et al., (2008). 
  
 
12 
 
For example, Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) use the ratio of capital flows to GDP as a proxy for 
the degree of external liberalization. Bekaert et al., (2005) use market capitalization to capture 
the intensity of equity market liberalization. These continuous measures are obviously affected 
by a number of factors besides liberalization.  
With an increased interest on the study of financial liberalization, scholars have 
developed the dichotomous measures of financial liberalization from simple dummies to 
incorporate intensity of liberalization. Two recent available databases are constructed by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) and Abiad et al., (2008). The former includes three-level 
financial liberalization indices for capital account controls, interest rate controls, and equity 
market restrictions in 28 countries from 1973 through 1999.  
The Financial Reforms Database in Abiad et al. (2008) categorizes financial reforms into 
seven dimensions each year from 1973-2005.12 Six of them refer to liberalization in the form of 
elimination of credit allocation controls, interest rate controls, capital account controls, equity 
market controls, entry barriers and privatization while the seventh dimension captures strength of 
bank capital regulation and supervision (CRS). The intensity of each reform category is captured 
on a four-point scale from fully repressed to fully liberalized for the six dimensions of 
liberalization. The CRS-dimension will be discussed in the next section. The data are available 
for 98 countries.  
The more comprehensive databases have allowed analyses of effects of different types of 
liberalization. However, as pointed out by Abiad and Mody (2005) and Angkinand et al., 
(2010), all dimensions of financial liberalization are highly correlated since one type of 
liberalization is often accompanied or followed by other types of liberalization. Therefore, 
identification of effects of specific types of liberalization can be uncertain. Abiad and Mody 
                                                 
12 The data are availalbe to the public at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=22485.0 (accessed 31 July 2011).  
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(2005) use only an aggregate index based on all available categories of financial reforms in their 
empirical study. Angkinand et al., (2010) use an aggregate index as well as three types of 
liberalization which are grouped based on six financial liberalization variables. They find that 
the most important type of liberalizations in associating with an increased likelihood of a 
banking crisis is the relaxation of restrictions on banks’ actions and behavior (i.e. relaxation of 
interest and credit controls), but this relationship can be clearly distinguished from the effects of 
other types of liberalization only when it is conditioned on the strength of capital regulation and 
supervision (CRS) in the domestic banking system. 
Finally we note that recent studies by Angkinand et al., (2010) and Shehzad and de Haan 
(2011) do not confirm the conventional wisdom that financial liberalization always increases the 
likelihood of banking crises. The former study finds that the likelihood of crises is at a 
maximum with partial liberalization while the latter finds that after some reform additional 
reforms lead to more stable financial systems. In the next section we will see how these results 
from these two studies are modified by interaction between liberalization and CRS.  
 
5. Data sets for Bank Regulation and Supervision  
Several studies investigate the effects of bank regulation and supervision on banking 
crises. These effects can be direct or captured by interaction between regulation or supervision 
and other variables like deposit insurance coverage or financial liberalization.   
The variables directly measuring bank regulation and supervision are available only from 
few data sources. There are related proxies for the quality of countries legal systems and 
bureaucracy. These proxies have greater coverage of countries and periods and they are likely to 
be highly correlated with effectiveness of regulation and supervision of banking systems. The 
databases commonly used in the literature are the following:   
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i.    The World Bank’s Regulation and Supervision of Banks around the World: a New 
Database, compiled by Barth, Caprio, Levine (2006) (the World Bank survey) 
ii. Financial Reforms database from Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008), International 
Monetary Fund (the variable called Enhancement of capital regulations and prudential 
supervision of the banking sector)  
iii. International Country Risk Guide, ICRG (the variables include law and order, 
corruption, bureaucratic quality) 13 
The first database is the most commonly used as it is available for more than 140 
countries, but the data availability is currently limited to three survey years; 1999, 2003 and 
2005. One advantage of the World Bank survey database is that it comprises of a large number of 
survey questions on how bank are regulated and supervised. Different aspects of regulation and 
supervision can be studied. The database includes questions on restrictions on bank activities, 
formal supervisory powers, ownership, organization, accounting and disclosure. The different 
dimensions can be objectively defined. Studies using this database generally create a composite 
index from a certain number of related survey questions to capture the extent of banking 
regulation to serve the purpose of their studies.   
The Financial Reforms Database provides data for the six types of financial liberalization 
discussed above as well as for “Enhancement of capital regulations and prudential supervision of 
the banking sector” (CRS). The scale of this variable goes from 0-3 where 0 = unregulated and 
unsupervised and 3 = strongly regulated and supervised.  This data set is available annually from 
1973-2005 for 91 countries. However, this database provides more limited aspects of banking 
regulation and supervision than the first database. It has only one dimension and is based on 
                                                 
13 The World Bank survey data are available to the public at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0. The data from ICRG, available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx, require subscriptions. See also footnote 12.   
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assessment of available information from different countries. Thus, it has a judgmental 
component.14  
We compare the data for CRS variables from the two mentioned sources by country 
group in Table 3. The data refers to 2005, the latest World Bank survey year. We construct an 
index from the three World Bank survey questions that are comparable to the components of 
CRS in the Financial Reforms database.  
Table 3 shows that on average the Financial Reforms database assigns a higher value of 
CRS to developed countries, a lower value for emerging market economies, and the lowest value 
for other less-developed countries. The World Bank survey, on the other hand, ranks the group of 
other less-developed countries above emerging markets in terms of having better bank regulation 
and supervision. The correlation between the two variables is as low as 0.4. 
[Table 3 here] 
Turning to the proxies for legal system and institutional quality, the most widely used 
variables in the banking crisis literature include Law and Order, Corruption, Bureaucratic 
Quality from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The data are available for more than 
150 countries and from 1984, and have been continuously updated. Other variables and sources, 
which have been less frequently used, in part due to the limited number of country and/or period 
coverage, are the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom index, the Heritage Foundation’s Index 
of Economic Freedom, the Worldwide Governance Indicators by Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 
(2009). The real GDP per capita is also used in some studies as proxy the general quality of 
domestic institutions. All these proxies reflect only general aspects of quality of institutions, and 
they may not directly measure bank regulation and supervision in the specific way researchers 
                                                 
14 For other sources of bank regulation data sets, Neyapti and Dincer (2005) develop an index of 
Legal Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision. They identify a total of 98 criteria related to 
the quality of banking regulation and code them using information retrieved from actual banking 
laws. However, we do not find that their data sets have been used in existing studies. 
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desire. However, the advantage of using the proxies from ICRG and GDP per capita is that they 
allow time series analysis. The general trend of institutional quality over time is positive 
although there are periods of reversals in some countries.  The trend for CRS in the Financial 
Reform database is positive as well.  
Given the relatively low correlation in cross-section between the two data sets for CRS it 
is not surprising that researchers come to different conclusions regarding the relationship 
between banking crisis and strength of regulation and supervision. For example, Barth et al., 
(2006) find that the probability of banking crises is reduced in countries with a high quality of 
law and order but not in countries with relatively strong CRS as measured by the World Bank 
survey. However, Angkinand et al., (2010) find that CRS from the Financial Reforms Database 
reduces the likelihood of banking crises in a cross-section time-series analysis. Barrell et al., 
(2010) also conclude that bank regulation and supervision reduce banking crisis probabilities for 
the sample of 14 OECD countries from 1980-2007. Their conclusion is based on continuous 
variables for the capital adequacy and liquidity ratios in banking systems. They do not observe 
significant effects for OECD countries of other proxies from Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 
(governance variable), the Heritage Foundation (banking- and economic freedom index), and the 
World Bank survey database (selected banking regulatory variables). Klomp (2010) does not 
find any evidence that a credit market regulations index from the Fraser Institute has a 
significant impact on the stability of the banking sector.  
Turning finally to the interaction between strength of regulation and supervision, and 
financial liberalization Shehzad and De Haan (2009) find that a positive impact on financial 
stability is conditional on adequate supervision. Similarly, Angkinand et al., (2010) find that the 
decline in likelihood of banking crisis associated with increased liberalization occurs only in 
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countries with strong capital regulation and supervision. In countries with weak regulation and 
supervision the effect of liberalization is the opposite.  
 
6. Assessment of usefulness of existing proxies and conclusions 
The analytical review and comparisons of various proxies for banking crises, as well as 
important banking crisis determinants–credit expansion, financial liberalization, and bank 
regulation and supervision–show that differences between proxies explain some contradictory 
results in the literature, as well as differences in sensitivity of the likelihood of banking crises to 
changes in explanatory factors. Understanding of the construction of different proxies can help 
the researcher choose the relevant proxy for the research objective in cross-country and time-
series analyses. Thus, the usefulness of a particular proxy depends on the research objective. We 
emphasize the following observations with respect to different variables:    
• Banking crises: Data for crisis dates, which are available in few studies, are compiled in a 
similar way and sometimes draw upon one another. Banking crisis episodes from the available 
data sources are highly correlated but there are differences as a result of differences in judgment 
about what defines a crisis. The researcher concerned primarily with very costly systemic crisis 
should choose the most restrictive crisis proxy. Differences in beginning and end dates of crises 
matter less as long as one crisis is considered one observation whether it lasts one or three years. 
It is obviously necessary to consider country and time coverage; statistical significance may have 
to be traded off against appropriateness of proxy.  
 A fruitful area of research is the analysis of the relation between market-based measures 
of probability of distress and other proxies for distress of individual banks as well as for systemic 
crises.    
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• Credit expansion: A continuous measure captures simply the growth of private bank 
credit while dichotomous measures place emphasis on identification of lending boom episodes. 
The former measure seems most appropriate for studies using continuous proxies for probability 
of crisis rather than 0/1 crisis dummies, and for tests of theoretical hypotheses with respect to 
determinants and effects of credit growth. The dichotomous measures are associated with much 
debate about the identification of “excess” credit growth relative to the growth endogenously 
associated with the economy’s performance. There is scope for theoretical as well as empirical 
research on this issue.  
• Financial liberalization: Attempts to measure financial liberalization have progressed 
from simple dichotomous measures to indices capturing a number of dimensions and degree of 
liberalization over time. Although the recently constructed comprehensive data sets, e.g. the IMF 
Financial Reforms database in Abiad et al., (2008) allow researchers to study the effects of 
different types of liberalization, the different types are highly correlated since most countries 
have moved towards greater liberalization. Moving away from simple dichotomous measures has 
led to results contradicting the conventional wisdom that liberalization contributes to the 
likelihood of banking crises. One remaining challenge is to be able to identify effects of different 
types of liberalization in order to produce meaningful policy implications with respect to effects 
of financial liberalization policies.   
• Bank regulation and supervision: there are tradeoffs in the choice between available 
proxies for strength of regulation and supervision. The data from the World Bank survey of bank 
regulation and supervision by Barth et al., (2006) consist of objective measures of many 
dimensions of regulation and supervision. Thus, they seem to be appropriate for studies of effects 
of specific reforms. The Financial Reform Database covers fewer dimensions but include 
informal judgment about effectiveness of regulation and supervision. Another trade-off exists 
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because the World Bank Survey data exist only for three years so far. The literature commonly 
assumes that bank regulations rarely change over time, but the proxies for bank regulation and 
institutional quality from other data sources show otherwise.  
 Finally we note that results with respect to the effects of financial liberalization and 
strength of regulation and supervision on banking crises are strongly affected by interaction 
between these variables. We suspect that banking crises are influenced by interaction between 
these variables and credit growth as well.   
 
  
 
20 
 
References 
 
Abiad, A. and Mody, A. (2005), “Financial reform: What shakes it? What shapes it?”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 95 No. 1, pp. 66-88.  
 
Abiad, A., Detragiache, E. and Tressel, T. (2008), “A new database of financial reforms”, IMF 
Working Paper No. 266, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 
 
Amri, P., Angkinand, A. and Wihlborg, C. (2011), “Are certain causes of credit growth less 
harmful than others?  Evidence from banking crises”, paper presented at the 86th Western 
Economic Association International (WEAI) Annual Conference, June 29 - July 2, San 
Diego, CA.  
 
Amri, P. and Kocher, B. (forthcoming), “The political economy of financial sector supervision 
and banking crises: A cross-country analysis”, European Law Journal. 
 
Angkinand, A., Sawangngoenyuang, W. and Wihlborg, C. (2010), “Financial liberalization and 
banking crises: A cross-country analysis”, International Review of Finance, Vol. 10 No. 2, 
pp. 263-292. 
 
Angkinand, A., Wihlborg, C. and Willett, T.D. (forthcoming), “Market discipline for financial 
institutions and markets for information” in Barth, J., Chen, L. and Wihlborg, C. (Eds),  
Handbook on Research in Banking and Governance, Edward Elgar.  
 
Angkinand, A. and Willett, T.D. (2011), “Exchange rate regimes and banking crises: Indirect 
channels investigated”, International Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 16 No. 3, 
pp. 256-274.  
 
Barrell, R., Davis, E.P., Karim, D. and Liadze, I. (2010), “Bank regulation, property prices and 
early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries”, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, Vol. 34 No. 9, pp. 2255-2264. 
 
Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr., G. and Levine, R. (2006), Rethinking Bank 
Regulation; Till Angels Govern, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, NY. 
 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. and Lundblad, C. (2005), “Growth volatility and financial 
liberalization”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 370-403. 
 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S., (1998), “The financial accelerator in a quantitative 
business cycle framework,”  NBER Working Paper No. 6455, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Boyd, J., De Nicolò, G. and Loukoianova, E. (2009), “Banking crises and crisis dating: theory 
and evidence”, IMF Working Paper No. 141, International Monetary Fund, Washington 
D.C. 
  
 
21 
 
 
Boyd, J. and Graham, S.L. (1986), “Risk, regulation, and bank holding company expansion into 
nonbanking”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol.10 No. 2, pp. 2-
17. 
 
Brownlee, C. T. and R. Engle (2010), “Volatility, correlation and systematic risk measurement”, 
Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, available at 
http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/analysis/RISK.USFIN-MR.MES.  
Caprio, G. and Klingebiel, D. (1996), “Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises”, 
World Bank, Washington D.C., mimeo. 
 
Caprio, G. and Klingebiel, D. (2002), “Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises”, in 
Klingebiel, D. and Laeven, L. (Eds.), Managing the Real and Fiscal Effects of Banking 
Crises, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 428, Washington, D.C., pp. 31-49.  
 
Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D., Laeven, L., and Noguera, G. (2005),  “Banking crisis database”, in 
Honohan, P. and Laeven, L. (Eds), Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and 
Resolution, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, pp. 307-340. 
 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P. and Roubini, N. (2001), “Fundamental determinants of the Asian crisis: 
the role of financial fragility and external imbalances”, in Ito, T. and Krueger, A.O. (Eds.), 
Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 11-46. 
 
Daniel, B.C. and Jones, J. B. (2007), “Financial liberalization and banking crises in emerging 
economies,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 7 No.1, pp.202-221. 
 
Das, U.S., Quintyn, M. and Chenard, K. (2004), “Does regulatory governance matter for 
financial system stability? An empirical analysis”, IMF Working Paper No. 89, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 
 
Davis, E. P. and Karim, D. (2008), “Comparing early warning systems for banking crises”, 
Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 89-120. 
 
Diamond, D.W. and Dybvig, P.H. (1983), “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity”, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 91 No. 3, pp. 401-419.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Detragiache, E. (1998) “The determinants of banking crises in 
developing and developed countries”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 81-109.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Detragiache, E. (2001), “Financial liberalization and financial fragility”, 
in Caprio, G. Honohan, P. and Stiglitz, J. E. (Eds), Financial Liberalization: How Far, 
How Fast? Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, pp. 96-124. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (2005), “Cross-country empirical studies of systemic 
bank distress: A survey”, National Institute Economic Review Vol. 192 No. 1, pp.68-83. 
  
 
22 
 
 
Drehmann, M. and Tarashev, N. (2011), “Systemic importance: Some simple indicators”, BIS 
Quarterly Review, Bank of International Settlements, March, pp. 25-37.  
 
Dziobek, C. and Pazarbasioglu, C. (1997), “Lessons from systemic bank restructuring: A survey 
of 24 countries”, IMF Working Paper No. 161, International Monetary Fund, Washington 
D.C. 
 
Eichengreen, B. and Arteta, C. (2002), “Banking crises in emerging markets: Presumptions and 
evidence” in Blejer, M.I. and Skreb, M. (Eds), Financial Policies in Emerging Markets. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
Gourinchas, P.O., Valdes, R.  and Landerretche, O.  (2001). “Lending booms: Latin America and 
the world”, Economia, Spring, pp. 47-99. 
 
Hakkio, C.S. and Keeton, W.R. (2009), “Financial stress: What is it, how can it be measured and 
why does it matter?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Vol. 94 No. 
2, pp. 5-50. 
 
Hovakimian, A., Kane, E. and Laeven, L. (2003), “How country and safety-net characteristics 
affect bank risk shifting”, Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp.177-
204. 
Illing, M. and Liu, Y. (2006), “Measuring financial stress in a developed country: An application 
to Canada”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 243-265. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2003), “Financial soundness indicators”, International Monetary 
Fund, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2003/051403.htm (accessed 
31 July 2011). 
 
Joyce, D. (2010), “Financial globalization and banking crises in emerging markets”, Open 
Economies Review DOI 10.1007/s11079-010-9179-8. 
 
Kaminsky, G. and Schmukler, S. (2008), “Short-run pain, long-run gain: The effects of financial 
liberalization”, Review of Finance, Vol.12 No. 2, pp. 253-292. 
 
Kaminsky, G., and Reinhart, C. (1999), “The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance-of-
payments problems”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89 No. 3, pp.473-500. 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2009), “Governance matters VIII: Aggregate and 
individual governance indicators, 1996-2008”, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4978, World Bank, Washington D.C.  
 
Kibritcioglu, A. (2002), “Excessive risk-taking, banking sector fragility, and banking crises”, 
Working Paper No. 02-0114, College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Illinois.  
 
  
 
23 
 
Klomp, J.  (2010), “Causes of banking crises revisited”, North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 72-87. 
 
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2008), “Systemic banking crises: A new database”, IMF Working 
Paper No. 224. International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 
 
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2010), “Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad and the 
ugly”, IMF Working Paper No. 146. International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 
 
Lindgren, C., Gillian, G. and Saal, M. (1996) Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy,  
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
 
Mendoza, E. G., and Terrones, M. E., (2008), “An anatomy of credit booms: evidence from 
macro aggregates and micro data”, IMF Working Paper No. 08/226, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
 
Mishkin, F. S. (1996), “Understanding financial crises: A developing country perspective”, in 
Bruno, M. and Pleskovic, B. (Eds), Annual World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, World Bank: Washington D.C., pp. 29-62. 
 
Neyapti, B.and Dincer, N. (2005) “Measuring the quality of bank regulation and supervision 
with an application to transition economies”, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp 79-99.  
 
Noy, I. (2004), “Financial Liberalization, prudential supervision and the onset of banking crises”, 
Emerging Markets Review, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 341-359. 
 
Potchamanawong, P., Denzau, A.T., Rongala, S.  Walton, J.C. and Willett, T.D. (2008), “A new 
and better measure of capital controls” in Banaian, K. and Roberts, B. (Eds), The Design 
and Use of Political Economy Indicators: Challenges of Definition, Aggregation, and 
Application, Palgrave MacMillan: New York, NY, pp. 81-102. 
 
Ranciere, R., Tornell, A. and Westermann, F. (2006), “Decomposing the effects of financial 
liberalization: Crises vs. growth”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 30 No. 12, pp. 
3331-3348. 
 
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009), This Time is Different, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ.  
 
Serwa, D. (2010), “Larger crises cost more: Impact of banking sector instability on output 
growth”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 29 No. 8, 1463-1481. 
 
von Hagen, J. and Ho, T. (2007), “Money market pressure and the determinants of banking 
crises”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 39 No. 5, pp. 1037-1066.  
 
Weller, C. (2001), “Financial crises after financial liberalization: exceptional circumstances or 
structural weakness?”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 98-127.  
  
 
24
 
 T
ab
le
 1
. M
ai
n 
D
at
a 
So
ur
ce
s f
or
 B
an
ki
ng
 C
ri
se
s a
t t
he
 C
ou
nt
ry
 L
ev
el
 
 
St
ud
y 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
fo
r 
ep
iso
de
 o
f b
an
ki
ng
 sy
st
em
 p
ro
bl
em
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
an
d 
ba
nk
in
g 
pr
ob
le
m
 e
pi
so
de
s 
Pe
ri
od
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 
Li
nd
gr
en
, G
ar
ci
a 
an
d 
Sa
al
 (1
99
6)
  
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
ru
ns
 o
r o
th
er
w
is
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l p
or
tfo
lio
 sh
ift
s, 
co
lla
ps
es
 o
f 
fin
an
ci
al
 fi
rm
s a
nd
/o
r m
as
si
ve
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t i
nt
er
ve
nt
io
n.
 T
w
o 
ge
ne
ra
l 
cl
as
se
s a
re
 id
en
tif
ie
d:
 “
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
” 
or
 “
cr
is
is
”.
  
13
3 
ou
t o
f 1
81
 IM
F 
m
em
be
rs
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 a
 b
an
ki
ng
 se
ct
or
 p
ro
bl
em
. 
10
6 
ep
is
od
es
 w
er
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
“s
ig
ni
fic
an
t”
, a
nd
 4
1 
ep
is
od
es
 in
 3
6 
co
un
tri
es
 w
er
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 “
cr
is
is
”.
  
19
80
-1
99
6 
C
ap
rio
 e
t a
l.,
 (2
00
5)
 
up
da
te
s C
ap
rio
 a
nd
 
K
lin
ge
bi
el
’s
 1
99
6,
 2
00
2 
st
ud
ie
s  
 
Th
e 
da
ta
se
t i
s b
as
ed
 o
n 
da
ta
 fo
r l
oa
n 
lo
ss
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
er
os
io
n 
of
 b
an
k 
ca
pi
ta
l, 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
ith
 e
xp
er
ts
, a
nd
 ju
dg
m
en
t w
he
th
er
 a
n 
ep
is
od
e 
co
ns
tit
ut
es
 a
 c
ris
is
. A
 b
an
ki
ng
 c
ris
is
 e
pi
so
de
 is
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
as
: “
sy
st
em
ic
” 
or
 
“n
on
-s
ys
te
m
ic
”.
 In
 a
 sy
st
em
ic
 c
ris
is
, m
uc
h 
or
 a
ll 
of
 b
an
k 
ca
pi
ta
l i
s 
ex
ha
us
te
d.
 In
 a
 n
on
-s
ys
te
m
ic
 o
r b
or
de
rli
ne
 c
ris
is
, a
 su
bs
et
 o
f b
an
ks
 
in
di
ca
te
s a
 b
an
ki
ng
 p
ro
bl
em
 su
ch
 a
s a
 la
rg
e-
sc
al
e 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n.
 
16
0 
ba
nk
in
g 
cr
is
is
 e
pi
so
de
s i
n 
al
l 
co
un
tri
es
. 4
6 
ep
is
od
es
 a
re
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s 
sy
st
em
ic
 c
ris
es
. 
 
19
70
s-
20
03
 
D
em
irg
üç
-K
un
t a
nd
 
D
et
ra
gi
ac
he
 (2
00
5)
 
up
da
te
s t
he
ir 
19
98
 st
ud
y 
 
 
Id
en
tif
ie
s, 
da
te
s a
nd
 u
pd
at
es
 e
pi
so
de
s u
si
ng
 a
bo
ve
 st
ud
ie
s a
nd
 o
th
er
s. 
O
ne
 
of
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
s m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
fo
r a
 c
ris
is
 to
 b
e 
id
en
tif
ie
d:
 
(i)
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f n
on
-p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
lo
an
s t
o 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s i
n 
th
e 
ba
nk
in
g 
sy
st
em
 
ex
ce
ed
s 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t, 
(ii
) t
he
 c
os
ts
 o
f r
es
cu
e 
op
er
at
io
n 
ex
ce
ed
s 2
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f 
G
D
P,
 (i
ii)
 th
er
e 
w
as
 la
rg
e 
sc
al
e 
na
tio
na
liz
at
io
n 
of
 b
an
ks
, o
r (
iv
) t
he
re
 w
er
e 
ex
te
ns
iv
e 
ru
ns
 o
r e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
m
ea
su
re
s t
o 
pr
ev
en
t r
un
s w
er
e 
ta
ke
n 
(d
ep
os
it 
fr
ee
ze
s, 
pr
ol
on
ge
d 
ba
nk
 h
ol
id
ay
s, 
or
 b
la
nk
et
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
s o
f d
ep
os
its
). 
62
 c
ou
nt
rie
s e
xp
er
ie
nc
in
g 
 8
3 
cr
is
es
 
19
80
-2
00
3 
R
ei
nh
ar
t a
nd
 R
og
of
f 
(2
00
9)
 
B
an
ki
ng
 c
ris
is
 e
pi
so
de
s a
re
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 (i
) b
an
k 
ru
ns
 th
at
 le
ad
 to
 
th
e 
cl
os
ur
e,
 m
er
gi
ng
 o
r t
ak
e 
ov
er
 b
y 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 se
ct
or
 o
f o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
of
 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
, o
r (
ii)
 w
he
n 
no
 b
an
k 
ru
ns
 o
cc
ur
, b
ut
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 
cl
os
ur
e,
 m
er
gi
ng
, t
ak
e-
ov
er
 o
r l
ar
ge
-s
ca
le
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
of
 a
n 
im
po
rta
nt
 fi
na
nc
ia
l i
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
 fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
si
m
ila
r o
ut
co
m
es
 fo
r o
th
er
 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
. 
66
 c
ou
nt
rie
s e
xp
er
ie
nc
in
g 
10
8 
ep
is
od
es
 
18
00
-2
00
9 
(b
ut
 o
nl
y 
da
ta
 
fr
om
 1
97
0 
ar
e 
us
ed
) 
La
ev
en
 a
nd
 V
al
en
ci
a 
(2
00
8,
 2
01
0)
 
B
an
ki
ng
 c
ris
is
 e
pi
so
de
s a
re
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 (i
) d
ep
os
it 
ru
ns
, (
ii)
 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 d
ep
os
it 
fr
ee
ze
/b
la
nk
et
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
, (
iii
) e
xt
en
si
ve
 li
qu
id
ity
 
su
pp
or
t, 
(iv
) b
an
k 
in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
/b
an
k 
ta
ke
ov
er
s, 
or
 (v
) h
ig
h 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 
no
n-
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
lo
an
s (
N
PL
) w
hi
ch
 tr
an
sl
at
es
 in
to
 lo
ss
 o
f m
os
t o
f t
he
 
ca
pi
ta
l i
n 
th
e 
sy
st
em
.  
12
3 
co
un
tri
es
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
in
g 
14
5 
ep
is
od
es
 
19
73
-2
00
8 
 
  
 
25 
 
Table 2. Measures of Credit Growth in the Banking Crisis Literature 
Measures of 
credit 
Data source Authors Binary or 
continuous 
Findings 
1.Real credit per 
capita: Real credit is 
the average of two 
contiguous end-of-
year values, deflated 
by the end-of-year 
consumer price 
index.  
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS) 
Mendoza & 
Terrones (2008)   
binary variable, set 
using standard  
Hondrik-Prescott 
(HP) Filter 
Credit booms coincide 
with or precede banking 
crises in both advanced 
and emerging markets.  
 
2. Real domestic 
credit to the private 
sector credit to  
GDP ratio: credit is 
financial resources 
provided to the 
private sector, such 
as through loans, 
purchases of non-
equity securities, 
and trade credits 
and other accounts 
receivables. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
Gourinchas et al 
(2001)  
Binary variable, set 
using expanding 
HP Filter 
The link is tenuous. 
Most banking crises are 
preceded by lending 
booms, but most lending 
booms are not followed 
by a banking crisis. 
WDI Borio and 
Drehman (2009) 
Binary variable, set 
using rolling  HP 
filter 
In 18 industrial countries 
(1980-2008), sharp 
increases in both credit 
and asset prices precede 
banking crises.  
WDI Joyce (2010),  
Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache 
(1998). 
Continuous 
variable: one year 
growth of private 
credit to GDP ratio. 
Using panel logit/probit 
models, an increase in 
credit growth 
significantly leads to an 
increase in the 
probability of a banking 
crisis.  
3. Real domestic 
private credit 
growth/real GDP 
growth, three years 
prior to a banking 
crisis.  
 
WDI Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) 
Dummy variable 
=1 if the variable is 
between 0-2.5%.   
Positive link between 
rapid credit growth and 
crises applies to Latin 
America, but not when 
considering a larger set 
of countries.  
3. Net domestic 
credit: the sum of 
net credit to the 
nonfinancial public 
sector, credit to the 
private sector, and 
other accounts. 
 WDI Eichengreen and 
Arteta (2002) 
Continuous 
variable, not 
weighted by GDP.  
In 75 emerging markets 
(1975-97), credit growth 
is positive and 
significantly related to 
banking crisis 
probabilities. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on studies cited in text, WDI and IFS. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Bank Regulation Data  
 
The World Bank survey 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine) 
Financial Reforms 
Database 
(Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel) 
Developed economies 0.82 0.89 
Emerging market economies 0.74 0.65 
Other less developed countries 0.78 0.55 
    All countries 0.78 0.68 
Note: the data in the table are average values of the capital regulation and supervision (CRS) variable in 2005 
by country group. The CRS variable in the third column is from the Financial Reforms database by Abiad et al., 
(2008).The CRS variable in the second column is constructed based on the comparable survey questions from the 
World Bank survey by Barth et al., (2006). See the working version of this paper for detail explanations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
